Published on 05 July 2018
We propose a model of potential land users, which allows quantifying the efficiency of a number of mechanisms of agricultural land distribution for mountainous land-hungry regions. Land users are represented as economic agents with bounded rationality and subjective utility functions. The model calculates allocation efficiency and budget efficiency as independent values and thus allows us to better determine the applicability of a specific land distribution mechanism. The model has considerable flexibility and can be adjusted to specific agricultural technology and soil types. An analysis of the efficiency of using closed form auctions for the distribution of farmland conducted for the test region showed that, with both a simple first price tender and a Vickrey auction, the optimal allocation of land is achieved in the model. The use of lottery mechanisms, on the contrary, leads to losses of allocative efficiency. As for the budget revenues, the use of lottery mechanisms leads to much smaller losses of budgetary efficiency in comparison with simultaneous closed auctions of the first and second prices. Of all the mechanisms considered, the use of the repetitive Vickrey auction leads to the smallest losses of budget efficiency in the model
Categories: Articles, Geo-ecological,-Recreational-and-Biomedical-Issues-of-SDMT
Tags: малоземельный горный регион, земельная реформа, аллокативная эффективность, механизмы распределения, аукционы.
ISSN 1998-4502 (Print) ISSN 2499-975Х (Online)